

Student Schedule Metaphysics of Mind - Dualist theories - Substance dualism and property dualism part 1
Autumn Half Term 1 , 24-25

Lesson Number & Title	Syllabus Content	Planned Study
01 Substance and property	Substance Property	Cardinal p185-188 (revision), anthology 2.1 https://www.massolit.io/courses/mind-body-dualism/what-is-the-mind-body-problem Lacewing p168-176 (revision)
02 Dualism and physicalism / idealism, including Substance Dualism	Substance dualism Minds exist and are not identical to bodies or to parts of bodies.	Cardinal p188-194, anthology 2.2 https://www.massolit.io/courses/the-mind-body-problem/the-mind-body-problem Lacewing p176-181
03 Descartes' indivisibility argument	The indivisibility argument for substance dualism (Descartes).	Cardinal p195-196, anthology 2.4 https://www.massolit.io/courses/the-mind-body-problem/plato-and-aristotle Lacewing p182-183
04 Responses to Descartes' indivisibility argument	Responses, including: the mental is divisible in some sense not everything thought of as physical is divisible.	Cardinal p196-199, anthology 2.3 https://www.massolit.io/courses/mind-body-dualism/descartes-and-the-history-of-dualism Lacewing p183-185
05 Descartes' conceivability argument	The conceivability argument for substance dualism (expressed without reference to God) (Descartes).	Cardinal p199-203, anthology 2.5 https://www.massolit.io/courses/mind-body-dualism/the-conceivability-argument Lacewing p185-187
06 Responses to Descartes' conceivability argument part 1	response #1 to the conceivability argument: mind without body is not conceivable	Cardinal p203-207 https://www.massolit.io/courses/the-mind-body-problem/cartesian-dualism Lacewing p187-188
07 Responses to Descartes' conceivability argument part 2	response #2 to the conceivability argument: what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible; Response #3 to the conceivability argument: what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the actual world	Cardinal p208-210 https://www.massolit.io/courses/descartes-meditations-on-first-philosophy/mind-and-body Lacewing p189-196
08 property dualism including arguments over substance dualism	Property dualism There are at least some mental properties that are neither reducible to nor supervenient upon physical properties.	Cardinal p210-213 https://www.massolit.io/courses/descartes-meditations-on-first-philosophy/the-father-of-modern-philosophy Lacewing p291-293
09 David Chalmers' philosophical zombies argument	The 'philosophical zombies' argument for property dualism (David Chalmers).	Cardinal p213-216, anthology 2.6 https://www.massolit.io/courses/materialism/problems-with-materialism Lacewing p301-309
10 Responses to David Chalmers' philosophical zombies argument part 1	a 'philosophical zombie'/a 'zombie' world is not conceivable what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible	Cardinal p216-218 https://www.massolit.io/courses/materialism/responses-to-the-knowledge-zombie-arguments Lacewing p311-313
11 Responses to David Chalmers' philosophical zombies argument part 2	what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the actual world.	Cardinal p218-200 https://www.massolit.io/courses/medieval-philosophy/avicenna Lacewing p313-323
12 Assessment		Revising for assessment / consolidation

Student Schedule Metaphysics of Mind - Dualist theories – property dualism part 2 and issues for both forms of Dualism
Autumn Half Term 2, 24-25

Lesson Number & Title	Syllabus Content	Planned Study
01 The Philosophical Zombies Argument for property dualism	The 'philosophical zombies' argument for property dualism (David Chalmers).	Cardinal p212-216 https://www.massolit.io/courses/materialism/what-is-materialism Lacewing p301-310
02 Responses to the Philosophical Zombies Argument (Continued)	a 'philosophical zombie'/a 'zombie' world is not conceivable what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible	Cardinal p216-218 https://www.massolit.io/courses/materialism/2-arguments-for-materialism Lacewing p311-314
03 Responses to the Philosophical Zombies Argument (Final lesson)	what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the actual world.	Cardinal p218-220 https://www.massolit.io/courses/materialism/problems-with-materialism Lacewing p315-323
04 Mary's Room explained	The 'knowledge/Mary' argument for property dualism (Frank Jackson)	Cardinal p220-221, anthology 2.7 https://www.massolit.io/courses/materialism/responses-to-the-knowledge-zombie-arguments Lacewing p291-296
05 Mary's Room – the responses	Mary does not gain new propositional knowledge but does gain ability knowledge (the 'ability knowledge' response). • Mary does not gain new propositional knowledge but does gain acquaintance knowledge (the 'acquaintance knowledge' response) *Mary gains new propositional knowledge, but this is knowledge of physical facts that she already knew in a different way (the 'New Knowledge / Old Fact' response).	Cardinal p221-231 https://www.massolit.io/courses/materialism/the-nature-of-material-features Lacewing p297-301
06 The Problem Of Other Minds	The problem of other minds	Cardinal p231-233, anthology 2.10, https://www.massolit.io/courses/materialism/representation-and-phenomenal-consciousness Lacewing p201-202, p329-330
07 Responses To The Problem Of Other Minds	Responses including: • the argument from analogy • the existence of other minds is the best hypothesis.	Cardinal p234-241, anthology 2.11 https://www.massolit.io/courses/mind-body-dualism/problems-with-dualism Lacewing 202-207
08 Dualism Makes A Category Mistake	• Dualism makes a "category mistake" (Gilbert Ryle)	Cardinal p242-245, anthology 2.12 https://www.massolit.io/courses/mind-body-dualism/the-connection-between-mind-and-body Lacewing p207-209, p330-331
09 Causal Models For Dualism	Interactionist Dualism Epiphenomenalist Dualism	Cardinal p245-246, p251-254 https://www.massolit.io/courses/mind-body-dualism/the-knowledge-argument Lacewing p196, p200
10 Problems For Interactionist Dualism	Princess Elizabeth Empirical Problem	Cardinal p246-251, anthology 2.13 https://www.massolit.io/courses/the-mind-body-problem/the-hard-problem Lacewing p197-200, p323-324
11 Problems For Epiphenomenalist Dualism	the challenge posed by introspective self-knowledge the challenge posed by the phenomenology of our mental life (ie as involving causal connections, or both) psychological and psycho-physical) the challenge posed by natural selection/evolution	Cardinal p254-261, anthology 2.14, anthology 2.15 https://www.massolit.io/courses/the-mind-body-problem/materialism Lacewing p200-201, p325-329
12 Assessment	.	

Student Schedule Metaphysics of Mind - Physicalist theories – philosophical behaviourism, Mind-brain type identity theory

Spring Half Term 1, 24-25

Lesson Number & Title	Syllabus Content	Planned Study
01 Physicalism, Behaviourism	Physicalism Everything is physical or supervenes upon the physical (this includes properties, events, objects and any substance(s) that exist). Philosophical behaviourism:	Cardinal p262-263 https://www.massolit.io/courses/verificationism/background-to-verificationism Lacewing p212-216, p239-240
02 Hard behaviourism	'Hard' behaviourism: all propositions about mental states can be reduced without loss of meaning to propositions that exclusively use the language of physics to talk about bodily states/movements (including Carl Hempel).	Cardinal p263-265 https://www.massolit.io/courses/the-mind-body-problem/behaviourism-4bb248ef-2a8c-4d10-b8a7-b7253131e770 Lacewing p240-245
03 Soft behaviourism	'Soft' behaviourism: propositions about mental states are propositions about behavioural dispositions (ie propositions that use ordinary language) (including Gilbert Ryle).	Cardinal p268-270, anthology 2.17 https://www.massolit.io/courses/verificationism/verification-and-philosophy Lacewing p245-251
04 Issues for behaviourism 1	the distinctness of mental states from behaviour (including Hilary Putnam's 'Super-Spartans' and perfect actors)	Cardinal p272-273, anthology 2.16 https://www.massolit.io/courses/verificationism/modifying-verificationism Lacewing p263-265
05 Issues for behaviourism 2	issues defining mental states satisfactorily due to (a) circularity and (b) the multiple realisability of mental states in behaviour the asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of other people's mental states.	Cardinal p265-268, p271 https://www.massolit.io/courses/verificationism/problems-with-verificationism Lacewing p253-263
06 Issues for behaviourism 3	dualist arguments applied to philosophical behaviourism	Cardinal p271-272 https://www.massolit.io/courses/verificationism/quine-s-two-dogmas-of-empiricism Lacewing p251-252, p296, p310
07 Ontological reduction, types, tokens, numerical identity	'ontological' reduction	Cardinal p273-275, anthology 2.18 anthology 2.19 https://www.massolit.io/courses/wittgenstein-s-language-games Lacewing p216-218
08 Mind-brain identity theory including advantages	Mind-brain type identity theory All mental states are identical to brain states ('ontological' reduction) although 'mental state' and 'brain state' are not synonymous (so not an 'analytic' reduction).	Cardinal p275-277, anthology 2.20, anthology 2.21 https://www.massolit.io/courses/brain-imaging/state-of-the-art Lacewing p218-220
09 • issues with providing the type identities (the multiple realisability of mental states).	Issue with mind-brain identity theory: issues with providing the type identities (the multiple realisability of mental states).	Cardinal p282-285 https://www.massolit.io/courses/brain-imaging/diagnosing-brain-diseases Lacewing p221-223
10 Dualist arguments 1	Issue with mind-brain identity theory: application of conceivability argument, indivisibility argument	Cardinal p277-279 https://www.massolit.io/courses/brain-imaging/limitation-of-brain-imaging Lacewing p223-224
11 Dualist arguments 2	Issue with mind-brain identity theory: application of philosophical zombies argument, knowledge argument	Cardinal p280-282, anthology 2.22 https://www.massolit.io/courses/brain-imaging/beyond-brain-imaging Lacewing p296, p310
12 Assessment		

Student Schedule Metaphysics of Mind - Physicalist theories – Eliminative materialism . And Functionalism
Spring Half Term 2, 24-25

Lesson Number & Title	Syllabus Content	Planned Study
01 Eliminative Materialism - introduction	Eliminative materialism Some or all common-sense ("folk-psychological") mental states/properties do not exist and our common-sense understanding is radically mistaken (as defended by Patricia Churchland and Paul Churchland).	Cardinal p285-287, Anthology 2.19 https://www.massolit.io/courses/personal-identity/introduction-b6edd6f5-42f3-4a6a-b746-3c39d7f06ec5 (extension) Lacewing p225-232
02 Eliminative Matertialism – arguments in favour, discussion		Cardinal p287-290 https://www.massolit.io/courses/personal-identity/personal-identity-5cd754b1-563a-4115-a205-2214ff82ca94 (extension) Lacewing p232-234
03 EM issue one - our certainty about the existence of our mental states takes priority over other considerations	Issue: our certainty about the existence of our mental states takes priority over other considerations	Cardinal p290-291 https://www.massolit.io/courses/personal-identity/the-problem-of-personal-identity (extension) Lacewing p234-235
04 EM issue two - folk-psychology has good predictive and explanatory power (and so is the best hypothesis)	Issue: folk-psychology has good predictive and explanatory power (and so is the best hypothesis)	Cardinal p291-293 https://www.massolit.io/courses/personal-identity/john-locke-on-personal-identity (extension) Lacewing p235-236
05 EM issue three - the articulation of eliminative materialism as a theory is self-refuting.	Issue: the articulation of eliminative materialism as a theory is self-refuting.	Cardinal p293-294 https://www.massolit.io/courses/personal-identity/the-transplant-case (extension) Lacewing p237-238
06 EM and exam questions		https://www.massolit.io/courses/personal-identity/the-bodily-criterion (extension)
07 Functionalism – introduction	Functionalism Functionalism: all mental states can be characterised in terms of functional roles which can be multiply realised.	Cardinal p294-297 https://www.massolit.io/courses/personal-identity/the-psychological-continuity-view (extension) Lacewing p268-271
08 Functionalism – arguments in favour, discussion		Cardinal p297-299, Anthology 2.24 https://www.massolit.io/courses/personal-identity/the-fission-problem (extension) Lacewing p271-276
09 Functionalism issue one -the possibility of a functional duplicate with different qualia (inverted qualia)	Issue: the possibility of a functional duplicate with different qualia (inverted qualia)	Cardinal p299-300 https://www.massolit.io/courses/personal-identity/survival-and-what-matters (extension) Lacewing p276-282
10 Functionalism issue two - the possibility of a functional duplicate with no mentality/qualia (Ned Block's China thought experiment)	Issue: the possibility of a functional duplicate with no mentality/qualia (Ned Block's China thought experiment)	Cardinal p301-302, Anthology 2.25 https://www.massolit.io/courses/personal-identity/animalism (extension) Lacewing p282-291
11 Functionalism issue three - the 'knowledge'/Mary argument can be applied to functional facts (no amount of facts about function suffices to explain qualia).	Issue: the 'knowledge'/Mary argument can be applied to functional facts (no amount of facts about function suffices to explain qualia).	Cardinal p300-301 https://www.massolit.io/courses/the-philosophy-of-john-locke/personal-identity (extension) Lacewing p296
12 Functionalism and exam questions		

